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Non-Technical Summary
In models of firm-union wage-bargaining, a higher degree of labour income tax pro-
gressivity can contribute to wage moderation and thereby reduce unemployment.
This is because tax progressivity alters the wage-employment trade-off for the union.
With a high marginal tax rate, even a small increase in the consumer wage causes
much higher labour costs and therefore large employment losses. This may induce
the union to moderate its wage claims.
While a qualitative effect of this sort is generally accepted in the literature, its
quantitative impact and relative importance as compared to possible countervailing
effects (endogenous hours of work and human capital formation) is an open ques-
tion. This paper shows via a simple numerical model that minor changes in the
formulation of the fallback option of the union can change the quantitative effects
of tax progressivity drastically. The paper compares two modelling variants: In the
first one, there are no alternative employment options for the union members in
other sectors of the economy. In the second one, workers are mobile between sectors
and the probability of a job in another sector equals the overall employment rate.
The paper shows that the second modelling variant is preferable on two grounds:
(1) With no alternative employment options, the effects of tax progressivity are
unrealistically high. In effect, even slight increases in tax progressivity are sufficient
to attain full employment. (2) In the model with no alternative employment options,
we are bound to the conclusion that tax rates in a realistic range are Laffer-inefficient.
It would thus be possible to increase tax revenue by cutting tax rates.
The modelling variant with alternative employment options does not suffer from
these unrealistic features. However, it contains a slight logical inconsistency. The
paper shows that eliminating this inconsistency by explicitly modelling the dynamics
of labour market states does not alter the numerical results significantly.
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Abstract
When we analyse the labour market consequences of labour tax reforms in
a model of firm-union wage bargaining, minor changes in the formulation of
the union’s fallback option can have drastic effects. This paper compares two
variants of the model in which either workers have no reemployment oppor-
tunity or the probability of employment in another sector is determined by
the overall unemployment rate. It is argued both on analytical and numerical
grounds that the second alternative is the only plausible one. This conclusion
is confirmed by an explicit integration of workers’ inter-sectoral mobility into
the model.
Keywords: labour taxation, tax progression, tax reform, trade unions,
unemployment, labour mobility
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1 Introduction
The taxation of labour features prominently among the factors that are held respon-
sible for the high and persistent unemployment rates in most European countries.
Besides the overall tax level, the structure of labour taxation has also received in-
terest. A number of theoretical studies from the 1990s have shown that a higher
degree of progressivity of the labour tax can contribute to reducing unemployment
(Koskela/Vilmunen 1996, Holm/Koskela 1996, Sørensen 1997). These findings have
been backed up by several empirical investigations that broadly confirm that tax
progressivity is good for employment (Lockwood/Manning 1993, Holmlund/Kolm
1995, Aronson/Wickstro¨m/Bra¨nnlund 1997, Schneider 2000).
The labour market effect of tax progressivity can be analysed in different models
of unemployment (see the comparative studies of Pissarides, 1998, and Sørensen,
1999). In this paper, I concentrate on the union-firm wage-bargaining model, which
is often thought to be best suited to many European labour markets. In such a
bargaining setting, the effects of tax progressivity are quite intuitive. The parties of
the bargain face a wage-employment trade-off, which can be altered by the tax rates.
The higher the marginal tax rate (which, at a given average tax rate, amounts to
higher progressivity) the more “expensive” a higher wage in terms of employment
is. Higher tax progressivity thus leads to wage moderation and higher employment.
In the literature, there are different ways of modelling the wage bargaining set-
ting, but the qualitative findings about the effects of tax progression in this context
seem to be robust. Usually, the choice of a certain specification of the union-firm
bargain is not explicitly motivated. The details of the bargaining model are gener-
ally thought not to matter much for its overall behaviour. In this paper, I point to
a modelling detail that, opon inspection, makes this view untenable. The feature of
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the models I focus on is the formulation of the union member’s fallback option. The
uniformity in the qualitative findings hides important differences both in the mecha-
nismen of adjustment and in the quantitative reaction of the endogenous variables in
a numerical simulation setting. In this paper, I compare two different formulations
of the union’s fallback option. The first rests on the assumption that union mem-
bers who are not employed in the home sector of their union receive unemployment
benefits with certainty. This formulation will be called “NA” (for “No Alternative
employment”) throughout the paper. Alternatively, in the second formulation, it
is assumed that there is a certain possibility for union members not employed in
the union’s home sector to get work in another sector. I call this variant “IM” (for
“Inter-sectoral Mobility”). The difference between the two variants of the model
seems to be a minor detail, but in fact results in two totally distinct mechanisms
of adjustment to tax rate changes. This has severe consequences. The paper shows
that the NA variant of the model (no alternative employment possibilities) can be
characterised in the following ways: (i) It reacts by far more sensitively to shifts
in the tax rates than the IM variant. (ii) There is no limit for the employment
boosting effect of tax reforms other than full employment. In fact, very small tax
rate changes are sufficient to bring about full employment. (iii) The standard as-
sumption of Laffer-efficiency of the tax rates cannot be met with parameter values
within a reasonable range.
Given these implausible results of the NA variant of the model, it comes as no
surprise that in numerical simulations of tax rate changes (Pissarides 1998, Sørensen,
1999) the IM variant (inter-sectoral mobility) is used. But this is usually done with-
out explicitly discussing alternatives and without justifying the choice of one of them.
However, it is important to compare the alternatives explicitly for two reasons: First,
strictly considered, the IM variant is inconsistent: It equates the unconditional and
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a conditional probability of unemployment (see Section 5). It must be shown that
this inconsistency can be tolerated. Second, the NA variant is widely used in ana-
lytical models that study the effects of tax rate changes (Koskela/Vilmunen 1996,
Holm/Koskela 1996, Koskela/Scho¨b/Sinn 1998, Fuest/Huber 1999, Boeters/Schneider
1999, Marsiliani/Renstro¨m 2000). Given the defects of the NA variant demonstrated
in this paper, the findings of that strand of the literature should be reconsidered.
As both the NA and the IM variant of the model are unsatisfactory in some
respects, I round off the analysis of this paper by drawing on an explicit model
of inter-sectoral worker mobility proposed by Layard/Nickell (1990). The resulting
third variant of the model shows both analytically and numerically much more
similarity to the IM variant than to its rival. Thus, the IM variant is supported and
the doubt about the NA variant is confirmed.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple general framework of
wage bargaining, which follows Holmlund/Kolm (1995), Marsiliani/Renstro¨m (1997)
and Sørensen (1999). Both variants of the union’s fallback option are formalised
within this general framework. Section 3 derives basic comparative static effects
with respect to the tax parameters and analytically demonstrates the difference
between the two modelling variants. Section 4 uses numerical calculations to close
some gaps that could not be decided analytically. In Section 5, I add an explicit
formulation of inter-sector worker mobility to the model and compare the outcome
to the two extreme cases of Sections 3 and 4. Section 6 concludes with a strong
statement in favour of the IM variant of the model.
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2 A simple model of wage bargaining
Consider an economy with a large number of symmetrical small sectors that interact
through monopolistic competition of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type. In each sector
there is one firm and one union that bargain over the wage. In the following, I
describe one representative sector; therefore, sector indices have been dropped.
The firm faces an output demand function of constant elasticity,
p = BQ−
1
σ , (1)
where p is the output price, Q is the quantity produced, σ is the elasticity of output
demand, which is derived from the household maximisation of a CES utility func-
tion with elasticity of substitution of σ over all product varieties (see Dixit/Stiglitz
1977 for details), and B is a variable that depends on the specific features of the
monoplistic interaction (number of sectors and degree of competition) as well as on
aggregate demand. Each firm is small as compared to the whole economy and treats
B as a constant1. The firm’s production is described by a decreasing returns-to-scale
function
Q = ALα, 0 < α < 1, (2)
with labour input L and a productivity parameter2 A. The firm’s profits are given
by
π = pQ− wL, (3)
1There is a separate appendix to this paper that shows the exact derivation of B and the closure
of the model through the assumption of symmetrical sectors. This appendix is available on request.
2This parameter only serves to normalise the wage at unity later in the numerical calculations.
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which, maximised subject to the output demand function, results in a mark-up
rule. The output price is set proportionally to the marginal costs of production (see
Appendix 1):
p =
σ
σ − 1
L1−α
αA w. (4)
The mark-up factor σ/(σ − 1) will be denoted by m in the following. With σ > 1
(to ensure an interior maximum of the firm’s profit), we have m > 1. The mark-up
rule (4) can be interpreted as a labour demand function when it is solved for L as
a function of the real wage, w/p.
On the labour market, the firm and a union bargain over the wage. I choose
this right-to-manage variant of the bargaining model, that is, firms are free to ad-
just employment given the outcome of the wage bargain. Alternatively, one could
consider a so-called “efficient bargaining model” where the bargaining also covers
employment (see e.g. Layard/Nickell 1990 for a comparision of the two models). I
stick to the right-to-manage model because bargaining over employment is rare in
Europe, and the two variants of the bargaining model do not differ significantly in
the context of labour tax progressivity (Sørensen 1999). The outcome of bargaining
over the wage is modelled as the solution to the Nash-bargaining problem
max
w,L
h
(U − U¯)L
iλ
π1−λ, (5)
subject to the labour demand function (4), where λ measures the bargaining power
of the union. The firm aims at maximising its profit, π, as given in (3). Its alter-
native option is not to produce at all, which means zero profits. The union aims at
maximising the expected income of its representative member3. U is the utility of an
3Like Pissarides (1998) and Koskela/Scho¨b/Sinn (1998), I abstract from the disutility of work,
as this would not add essential features to the model.
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employed union member, which is assumed linear in the after tax wage. The wage
tax schedule is linear progressive with a marginal tax rate t and a tax exemption4 of
a. (t and a will be referred to as the tax parameters. I generally assume 0 < t < 1
and 0 < a < w.) Thus we have
U = w˜ = (1− t)w + ta. (6)
The alternative option of the union members, U¯ , which forms the threat point of
the union in the bargaining problem (5), has two components. On the one hand, a
worker can find work in another sector, when there is no work available in the home
sector. By the symmetry assumption, she then receives a wage that is identical to
the wage in the home sector, w¯ = w˜. If no alternative job can be found, the worker
receives unemployment benefits, b. I assume a fixed replacement rate, c, which means
b is a constant fraction of the net-of-tax wage5, b = cw˜. The respective probabilities
of the two outcomes are denoted by 1− z(u) and z(u), which yields
U¯ = (1− z(u))w¯ + z(u)b. (7)
A survey of papers on wage bargaining in a public finance context shows that
they nearly exclusively use one of two popular specifications of z(u). A series of
papers (Holm/Koskela 1996, Koskela/Vilmunen 1996, Koskela/Scho¨b/Sinn 1998,
Koskela/Scho¨b 1999, Fuest/Huber 1999, Boeters/Schneider 1999, Daveri/Tabellini
4One might also consider the case in which the tax exemption is a fixed proportion of the wage,
a = a¯w. But observe that this formulation would run into problems. In equation (8) below, w
would cancel out and in the NA variant of the model an equilibrium would only be possible as an
improbable coincidence. Because of this, the case a = a¯w is not suited for a comparison of the two
variants of the model.
5For the comparison with the case of an unemployment benefit that is fixed in absolute terms,
see Pissarides (1998) or Koskela/Scho¨b (1999).
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2000) assume z simply to equal 1. This means that there are no alternative employ-
ment possibilities, irrespective of the overall unemployment rate. This is the NA
(“no alternative employment”) variant of the model. Another extreme assumption
(by Pissarides 1998, Sørensen 1999, Michaelis/Pflu¨ger 2000) is that z(u) = u; that
is, the probabiliy of finding a job elsewhere if not employed in the home sector ex-
actly equals the overall unemployment rate (“IM” variant, “inter-sector mobility”).
The general formulation (7) covers these two extreme cases together with possible
intermediate ones. A similar formulation can be found in Layard/Nickell/Jackmann
1991: 101.
3 Comparative statics of tax rate changes
3.1 Wage and employment reactions
Solving the Nash-bargaining problem unter the normalisation L = 1−u and subject
to the labour demand function (Appendix 2) results in the following wage equation
β (1− t)w
(1− t)w + ta = z(u)(1− c), (8)
where β is a positive constant derived from the parameters of the model: β =
λ(m−α)/(α+ λ(m−α)). The fraction term on the LHS is one minus the marginal
tax rate divided by one minus the average tax rate. This expression is known as the
“coefficient of residual income progression” (CRIP) and will be used later to study
the effects of tax rate changes. Together with labour demand,
w = γ(1− u)α−1, (9)
where γ is again a positive constant, γ = Aα/m, (8) forms a system in the en-
dogenous variables w and u, which describes the economy. The comparative statics
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of this system crucially depends on the sign of the Jacobian matrix, which cannot
unambiguously be determined in the general case. The crucial term to be signed is
(see Appendix 3):
J = (1− c)
"
taz(1− α)
1− u − z
0(u) [w(1− t) + ta]
#
. (10)
Given J , the effects of a partial variation of one of the tax parameters, t and a, on
unemployment can be determined as (see Appendix 4):
du
dt
= J−1
az(1− c)
(1− t)
du
da
= J−1zt(1− c)
Let us consider the two extreme cases of the previous section in turn. In variant
NA, when there are no alternative employment possibilities (z = 1, z0 = 0), the
second term in (10) drops out and J is positive, given that a, t > 0. This means
that a rise in both t and a results in higher unemployment. This finding does not
lend itself to an easy interpretation in terms of tax progressivity. If z is constant,
then (8) consists only of constants, except for the CRIP, the fraction term on the
LHS. The only remaining endogenous variable in (8), w, has to adjust when one of
the tax parameters changes to keep CRIP constant6. So if we take CRIP as our
measure of tax progressivity, all tax structures (combinations of a and t) exhibit
the same degree of progressivity in their respective equilibrium. But if we keep w
constant, a rise in both t and a will increase the degree of progressivity. Thus the
6If indirect progressivity of the tax schedule was generated by a fixed transfer, d, instead of
a tax exemption (i.e. w˜ = (1 − t)w + d), the after-tax wage, w˜, would be fixed by (8). A fixed
after-tax wage is an important benchmark result of Koskela/Scho¨b/Sinn (1998), which can only
arise in variant (1) of the model.
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entire tax schedule can be called “more progressive”. Under a linear progressive tax
schedule, progressivity decreases (CRIP increases) with income. Therefore, when tax
parameter changes make the tax schedule more progressive, the gross-of-tax wage
must rise for CRIP to remain constant. This, in turn, leads to higher unemployment.
As employment in the NA variant of the model is only detemined through the
labour demand function, there is no reason why tax policy (higher degree of progres-
sivity) should not be capable of attaining full employment. In fact, the numerical
calculations in Section 4 will show that even small changes in the tax parameters
can make unemployment completely disappear.
Note that it would be impossible to analyse the above effects if the tax schedule
had been restricted at the outset to have constant CRIP (as in Holmlund/Kolm
1995 or Sørensen 1999). If this were the case, only one of the remaining schedules
would be compatible with (8), and every variation of the tax system would result in
a corner solution (u = 1 or u = 0)7.
Consider, by contrast, variant IM of the model, where z(u) = u and z0 = 1. Then
in (10) the second term on the RHS enters and renders the sign of J ambiguous.
However, for usual calibration values of α and u, we can determine the sign of J. In
the IM variant, we have
J = (1− c)
·
ta
u− α
1− u − w(1− t)
¸
. (11)
In order for J to be negative, it is sufficient that u < α, which can reasonably be
assumed.
The change in the sign of J means that all comparative static effects are also
reversed. In particular, both a higher t and a higher a in the IM variant lead to lower
7To show this rigorously, system (8,9) would have to be recast as a system of inequalities, of
course.
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unemployment. If we again adopt the interpretation of tax progressivity in terms
of CRIP, we now have the well-known effects that higher progressivity (through
higher t or a) boosts employment. This is because a second channel of transmission
enters in (8) and dominates the first one, which governed the NA variant. Now u
appears (through z) directly in (8), and a lower CRIP (given the change in w does
not overcompensate) corresponds to a lower u.
This change in the transmission channel also has as a consequence that full
employment cannot be attained by the tax policy under normal circumstances. With
z(u) = u full employment (u = 0) would mean that the RHS of (8) becomes zero.
For (8) to hold, t would have to be set at 100% (given the restrictions on t and a
and w > 0). This amounts to an unrealistically extreme tax schedule, where the
government actually fixes the after-tax wage at a and confiscates any part of the
wage that exceeds this amount. Besides being unrealistic, this would not make any
sense in the bargaining context because it deprives the union of any incentive to
bargain for higher wages.
3.2 Laffer efficiency
Laffer-efficiency of the respective tax rates is an important criterion to assess the
overall plausibility of the two variants of the model. In fact, the assumption of Laffer-
efficiency is often used to derive clear-cut analytical results (e.g. by Koskela/Vilmunen
1996: 75). If taxes were actually Laffer-inefficient, the prescriptions for tax policy
would be blatantly simple: cut taxes, raise thereby tax revenue, and boost employ-
ment at the same time. This does not seem to be a realistic scenario.
However, Laffer-efficiency is an ambiguous concept if the government’s budget
depends on more than a single tax. It then has to be specified which measure of
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tax revenue is to be considered. For the model of this paper, the specification is
important in two respects. First, there must be a decision on whether to focus
on the revenue from labour taxation alone or to include the revenue from possible
other taxes. In line with Sørensen (1999) or Fuest/Huber (1999) and the prescip-
tions of optimal taxation literature, but contrary to Koskela/Vilmunen (1996) or
Koskela/Scho¨b/Sinn (1998), I will assume that there is a tax on profits and that
the question of the optimal design of distortionary taxes only arises if profits are
fully taxed away. Second, there must be a decision on how the public expenses for
the unemployment benefit are to be treated. Anticipating the welfare analysis of
the following section, it is most reasonable to define government’s tax revenue net
of unemployment benefit payments, G, as
G = t(w − a)(1− u) + π − uc [(1− t)w + ta] . (12)
G is that part of tax revenue that can be spent for publicly provided goods. A tax
reform that is “revenue-neutral” in the sense of keeping G constant is natural as
a basis for a welfare assessment because in this case the publicly provided goods
can be ignored, and we do not have to bother about the relative preference of the
household for these goods.
Analytical expressions for the impact of changes in the tax parameters, t and
a, on G are supplied in Appendix 4. Only in some cases can the sign of these
expressions be determined unambigously. In other cases, there are offsetting effects
that have to be weighted numerically. What we can say qualitatively is that if a tax
parameter change has large negative employment effects, tax revenue is likely to be
reduced. Through its influence on the employment effects, both the sign and the
value of the Jacobian determinant become crucial for assessing the Laffer-efficiency
of the tax parameters, too. The numerical calculations of Section 4 actually show
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that the Laffer-properties of the marginal tax rate, t, are reversed in the IM variant,
as compared to the NA variant.
3.3 Welfare
So far, the behaviour of the economy with respect to tax changes has only been
described in terms of the wage, unemployment and tax revenue. However, to assess
the desirability of a tax reform, it is also necessary to have a welfare measure. As
utility of the workers is assumed linear in the after-tax wage, which amounts to risk-
neutrality, the expected after-tax income of a worker is an appropriate indicator.
On the one hand, tax changes will influence the after-tax wage both directly and
indirectly through the labour costs, w. On the other hand, the rate of unemployment
adjusts, which changes the weights that determine the value of the expected income.
Expected income is
Y = [1− u(1− c)] [(1− t)w + ta] . (13)
Appendix 5 shows that the expressions we get for changes in expected income as a
response to the variation of a single tax parameter are similar to those for the tax
revenue. This means that we again have cases that can be determined analytically,
while others need a numerical calculation.
What we are really interested in, however, is not the consequences of isolated tax
parameter changes, but those of a revenue-neutral tax reform. Only if the amount
of publicly provided goods remains constant (that is, if G, as defined in (12), is
unchanged), can (13) be used as a welfare measure. In that case we have to weight
the effects of the partial variation of the tax parameters with their respective revenue
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effects, which have been computed in Section 3.2:
dY
dt
¯¯¯¯
¯
G=const
=
dY
dt
− dY
da
dG
dt
,
dG
da
. (14)
In Appendix 5, it is shown that (14) can considerably be simplyfied to only depend
qualitatively on du/da and dG/da. However, even the sign of this simplified version
can not be determined analytically. Again, it is necessary to turn to a numerical
specification of the model.
4 Numerical simulation
Both revenue and welfare effects of tax parameter changes can only partly be deter-
mined analytically. This section presents a numerical version of the model, which
allows us to also get a feeling for the quantitative effects that are caused by tax policy.
To generate results that are comparable to other numerical studies, I adopt the basic
calibration parameters from Sørensen (1999): m = 2.1, α = 0.7, c = 0.6, and for the
initial equilibrium u = 0.1 at an average tax rate of ta = t(1− a
w
) = 0.55. Whereas
Sørensen calibrates the initial equilibrium for a proportional tax system (a = 0), I
assume that there is already some indirect progression in the baseline situation8 due
to a tax exemption that equals one fifth of the gross wage: a = 0.2 ·w. Furthermore,
I normalise the wage, w, at unity in the initial equilibrium.
We start with the NA case (no alternative employment possibilities, z = 1).
Here, we get the following parameter values for the calibrated initial equilibrium:
λ = 0.679, B = 2.907, t = 0.688 and g = 2.268. As suggested by the analytical
calculations, tax rate changes in this case have drastic consequences. Table 1 reports
8Remember that with a proportional tax, the wage equation (8) in variant NA could only hold
by chance.
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the effects of a partial variation of one of the tax parameters on the wage, unemploy-
ment and the tax revenue. The qualitative results are already known from Section
3: A cut in t lowers unemployment, which is responsible for increasing tax revenue
(Laffer-inefficiency of t, Table 1a). The same holds for a cut in the tax exemption, a:
Unemployment goes down and tax revenue rises (Table 1b). But what strikes most
in both panels of Table 1 are the quantitative reactions. Even very small changes in
the tax parameters have enormous consequences for employment. A one percentage
point reduction in unemployment can be brought about by either lowering t from
68,75 to 68,68 per cent, or a from 0.2 to 0.1993. Consequently, full employment9 can
be attained by changes in the tax parameters that are hardly noticeable: t at 68.07
per cent or a at 0.1938. Considering a revenue-neutral tax reform (Table 2), these
extreme results are only slightly attenuated, because the tax changes now work in
opposite directions. To keep tax revenue constant, a cut in t (which leads to lower
u) must be complemented by a higher a (which raises u). Nevertheless, even in this
case full employment can be attained at relatively small changes of the tax rates:
t = 54 per cent and a = 0.36. These findings do not seem promising at all as a
plausible simulation of a real economy. Let us turn now to the second extreme case
and see whether it has advantages in this respect.
In the IM variant of the model, we have a probability of alternative employment
of 1 − u. The baseline calibration values result in the same initial equilibrium as
in variant NA, except for λ, which is now 0.031. Table 3 shows the impact of a
partial variation of t and a, respectively, on the wage, unemployment, and the tax
revenue. We find the analytical results from Section 3 illustrated: An increase in
9The last rows of Tables 1 and 2 are calculated without taking into account the labour supply
restriction u ≥ 0. The values of the endogenous variables are set in parentheses. They show that
the labour supply restriction must be explicitly added to the model in order to prevent negative
unemployment rates.
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t lowers unemployment and generates additional tax revenue. An increase in the
tax exemption, a, also leads to lower unemployment, but now this means less tax
revenue. Gross wage reactions are rather small, while unemployment is moderately
affected by tax changes. The range of the quantitative reactions is now broadly in
line with the results of similar simulation exercises by Pissarides (1998) and Sørensen
(1999). To drive unemployment down by one percentage point, an increase in t from
68.8 to 74.9 per cent or an increase in a from 0.20 to 0.27 is necessary10, both of
which are significant changes.
Turning to the simulation of a revenue-neutral tax reform, we see that changes
in both tax parameters reinforce one another (Table 4). A rise in t is now comple-
mented by a rise in a to compensate for the loss in tax revenue. Both tax parameter
changes, however, work in the direction of higher employment. Thus, the employ-
ment gains that can be achieved with a revenue neutral tax reform are higher than
those attainable with a variation of only one tax parameter. Under these circum-
stances, a one percentage-point reduction in unemployment is brought about by
raising t to 70.5 per cent and a to 0.25.
5 Modelling inter-sector mobility
Both variants of the model examined so far exhibit serious drawbacks when consid-
ered in more detail. This is obvious for the NA case (no alternative employment
opportunities). Why should the workers be bound to stay in their home sector even
if unemployment is very low and labour becomes scarce in the economy as a whole?
This variant of the model only can be defended under the following interpretation:
10As the gross wage remains practically at unity, the absolute changes in a can also be read in
terms of percentage points.
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Think of the union as a national monopoly in a small open economy. This econ-
omy is fully integrated in international product markets, but labour is completely
immobile. This interpretation of the model is only acceptable in countries with cen-
tralised wage bargaining, which is only the case for some of the European countries
(see the classification of European countries according to their labour market regime
in Daveri/Tabellini 2000). But even under this interpretation, we are left with the
grossly implausible simulation results of Section 4.
The IM variant of the model, in which the probability of getting a job elsewhere
equals the employment rate, seems more promising at first — but it suffers from
a logical inconsistency. Setting z = u amounts to equalising the unconditional
probability of being employed and the conditional probability of getting a job, given
that in the home sector no job is available. Elementary theorems of Probability
Theory suffice to show that this equlity can only hold if no-one gets a job in their
own sector11; but this does not make economic sense at all.
To avoid these defects of the two extreme cases, I draw on an explicit model
of inter-sectoral worker mobility by Layard/Nickell (1990): Assume that the wage
11In formal terms, the probability of being unemployed (U) can be decomposed:
P (U) = u = P (U |HE)P (HE) + P (U |NHE)P (NHE),
where “HE” and “NHE” stand for “(No) Home Employment”. We have P (U |HE) = 0 by defini-
tion; thus
u = P (U |NHE)P (NHE).
P (U |NHE) = u, which is assumed in the IM model, can then only hold if P (NHE) = 1. This
argument is independent of whether we deal with small or large sectors.
The intuition behind the formal result is equally simple: If at least some of the jobs are assigned
in a first round to home sector workers, the employment prospects of those who weren’t successful
in that first round must be worse than in average.
18
bargaining is repeated every period. There is an exogenous probability, s, that a
working contract is terminated and the worker leaves the firm. Every worker that
loses her job joins a homogenous unemployment pool where she faces an exit prob-
ability, a, which is endogenously determined by the steady state assumption. Given
that an individual sector is small compared to the whole economy, it is almost cer-
tain that the next employment will be in another sector. Under these assumptions,
we can formulate the following arbitrage equations for the value of a job in the home
sector, V ; in one of the other sectors, V˜ ; and of the state of unemployment, V¯ .
Vt = (1 + r)
−1
h
w˜ + sV¯t+1 + (1− s)Vt+1
i
,
V˜t = (1 + r)
−1
h
w¯ + sV¯t+1 + (1− s)V˜t+1
i
,
V¯t = (1 + r)
−1
h
b+ aV˜t+1 + (1− a)V¯t+1
i
,
where r is the interest rate for discounting. In the steady state, a = s(1 − u)/u,
Vt = Vt+1 = V, V¯t = V¯t+1 = V¯ , and V˜t = V˜t+1 = V˜ .
12 This allows us to compute
the following steady state value of the union’s bargaining position (V − V¯ must be
substituted for U − U¯ in (5) when we change from the one-period to a many-periods
context):
V − V¯ = 1
r + s
[w˜ − (1− z(u))w¯ − z(u)b] ,
with z(u) =
(r + s)u
ru+ s
.
We thus have determined a value for z that exceeds u (as r + s > ru + s) but
is below unity. We actually have found an intermediate case. With which of the
12This is one of two cases Layard/Nickell (1990) consider. They label it “infinit bargain”, i.e.
the wage bargained is valid for all future periods. There is a second variant, “one period bargain”,
which assumes that the wage is bargained over in every period and the union cannot commit
to a wage in the future. In this case, V˜t = V˜t+1 = Vt+1. The consequences of that change are
insignificant in the context of my paper.
19
extreme cases are we to expect this case to have more similarities? This depends on
the specification of the two new parameters, r and s. Obviously, the Layard/Nickell
(“LN”) case will converge to the NA case when s is close to zero or r is very large.
(In the first situation, there is hardly any fluctuation between employment and
unemployment; in the second situation, the union does not care about employment
in future periods.) Conversely, the LN case converges to the IM case (z = u) if
r → 0, in which case only the future employment in other sectors is relevant in the
long run. If we take the time period to be one year, reasonable parameter values
are r = 0.05 and s = 0.2. With an unemployment rate of u = 0.1 this results in a
situation that is very close to the IM assumption z = u. We then have z = 1.22·u and
z0 = 1.19, which is not significantly different from unity. While these are only loose
plausibility considerations, a numerical simulation in line with Section 4 confirms
that the LN variant of the bargaining model is very similar to the IM case. In fact,
the differences between the numerical simulation of this case and Tables 3 and 4 are
so small that I do not report them here. [But for comparison in the preliminary
draft, see Tables 5 and 6.] The LN model thus strongly backs up the IM variant of
the model while being in sharp contrast to the NA variant13.
6 Summary and Conclusions
What we know about labour market effects of counterfactual tax structures will al-
ways be based on a combination of empirical estimations and numerical simulations.
It is therefore important to know which factors determine the outcome of the models
that are used to perform the numerical simulations. Even the simple models used
13This justifies Pissarides’s (1998, 163) practice to use the IM variant “as an approximation and
to avoid an explicitly dynamic model.”
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in papers such as Pissarides (1998) or Sørensen (1999) can be modified in so many
respects that it is hardly possible to keep track of all the combinations: the number
of factors of production, the specification of the production function, small open
economy vs. closed economy, the parameterisation of the tax schedule, objective
function of the union, right-to-manage vs. efficient bargaining, taxation of profits,
inclusion of benefit payments in the government’s budget. The best we can hope
is that the model we actually use produces plausible results that are robust with
respect to modifications of some of the model’s key characteristics.
This paper focuses on one modelling detail that does not seem to be of much
significance at first sight, since different specifications are chosen without justifying
them against alternative models in different papers . However, it turns out that
this detail dramatically alters the behaviour of the model, both analytically and
numerically. The differences between the NA variant of the model (where there
are no alternative employment options for the single worker) and the IM variant of
the model (where the reemployment probability in another sector is given by the
employment rate of the whole economy) are listed below.
• First and foremost, there are two different mechanisms of adjustment that
govern the effect of the tax parameters on the endogenous variables of the
model. In the NA variant, only the wage, not unemployment, appears in the
wage equation. This means that the wage must adjust so that the progressivity
of the tax system at the adjusted wage remains constant. The wage, in turn,
determines employment and unemployment through the labour demand curve.
In the IM variant, in contrast, there is a second mechanism of adjustment which
dominates the first. Here unemployment directly appears in the wage equation
because it influences the alternative option of the workers. Adjustment now
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takes place mainly through unemployment as the weight of the unemployment
benefit in the alternative option.
• These different mechanisms analytically result in vastly diverging labour mar-
ket reactions of the model, which most prominently are indicated by the change
in sign of the Jacobian matrix.
• This, in turn, strongly bears on the labour market and tax revenue effects of
tax parameter changes. When plausible parameter values are chosen in the
NA variant, the marginal tax rate is bound to be Laffer-inefficient, and full
employment can easily be attained by tax reforms that only slightly alter the
tax parameters. In the IM variant, however, taxes are Laffer-efficient and even
large variations in the tax parameters can only partly remove unemployment.
While there is no analytical proof that would force us to dismiss the NA variant
of the model, there are several plausibility considerations that, taken together, are
strong grounds for favouring the IM variant:
• The NA variant exhibits labour market reactions, the implied optimism of
which can hardly be defended against the experience with real tax reforms
(very small tax rate changes are sufficient to bring about full employment).
• If we adopt the criterion for calibration that taxes must be Laffer-efficient,
this forces us to use the IM variant, because the marginal tax rate is Laffer-
inefficient in NA due to the large positive employment effects of tax rate cuts.
• An explicit model of inter-sector labour mobilitiy turns out to have a structure
very similar to IM, while it differs sharply from NA.
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Given these arguments in favour of a model that allows for labour mobility, it seems
necessary to reconsider the results of papers that heavily rely on a model structure
that includes the assumption of no alternative employment possibilities. Any model
implying that hardly noticeable changes in the tax parameters can bring about full
employment should not be taken seriously.
In any case, we have seen that minor variations in the formulation of the labour
market model can significantly influence the employment effects of tax parameter
changes. With regard to the alternative option of union members, the focus of
this paper, we have encountered forceful arguments in favour of a model version
that explicitly accounts for inter-sectoral labour mobility. Out empirical knowledge
about the extent to which workers actually change between sectors may then well
become an important determinant for the overall performance of models of unionised
labour markets.
7 Appendix
7.1 Firm’s profit maximisation
Firms maximise profits
π = pQ− wL,
where
p = BQ−
1
σ (15)
and
Q = ALα. (16)
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This gives
dπ
dL
= BA
σ−1
σ
α(σ − 1)
σ L
ασ−1σ −1 − w = 0.
Substituting (15) and (16) results in (4) in the main text.
7.2 Solution to the Nash-bargaining problem
The Nash bargaining problem is
max
w,L
h
(U − U¯)(1− u)
iλ
π1−λ
=
nh
(1− t)w + ta− U¯
i
(1− u)
oλ
[pQ− w(1− u)]1−λ
s.t. w = BA
1
m
α
m
(1− u)α−mm .
Taking logs on (17) and differentiating gives
λ(1− t)
z(u)(1− c) [(1− t)w + ta] −
(1− λ)α
(m− α)w − µ = 0, (18)
λ
(1− u) − µ
m− α
m
w
(1− u) = 0, (19)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier of the restriction and use has been made of
U − U¯ = z(u)(1− c) [(1− t)w + ta]
and
π = m− αα w(1− u).
Solving (19) for µ and inserting into (18) gives the wage equation (8) in the main
text.
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7.3 Comparative statics of tax parameter changes
The system (8), (9) is characterised by the following comparative statics:


−(1− t) [β − z(1− c)] z0(1− c) [(1− t)w + ta]
1 γ(α− 1)(1− u)α−2




dw
du

 =
=


−βw + z(w − a)(1− c) −zt(1− c)
0 0




dt
da

 ,
which, using (8) and (9), can be simplified to


− taz(1−c)
w
z0(1− c)w˜
1 −w(1−α)
1−u




dw
du

 =


−az(1−c)
1−t −zt(1− c)
0 0




dt
da

 .
The Jacobian determinant, J , of this equation is
J = (1− c)
"
taz(1− α)
1− u − z
0 [w(1− t) + ta]
#
(20)
as given in the main text. Its sign crucially depends on the specification of z(u).
But given the sign of J for a certain specification of z and certain values of the
parameters, we have the following comparative static effects:
dw
dt
= J−1
az(1− c)w(1− α)
(1− t) (1− u)
du
dt
= J−1
az(1− c)
(1− t)
dw
da
= J−1
zt(1− c)w(1− α)
(1− u)
du
da
= J−1zt(1− c)
where all the terms on the RHSs besides J−1 are unambiguously positive.
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7.4 Laffer-efficiency of taxes
Given full taxation of profits, the government’s budget can be expressed as
G =
µ
ta
α
m
+
m− α
m
¶
pQ− ucw(1− ta),
with ta denoting the average tax rate ta = t(1−a/w). Substitution for p and Q gives
G = w
·
(ta +
m− α
α )(1− u)− uc(1− t
a)
¸
. (21)
Totally differentiating with respect to w, u and ta, and using the relation between
dw/dτ and du/dτ that results from the labour demand function, we have for the
tax parameters τ = a, t:
dG
dτ = w
(
[1− u(1− c)]
Ã
∂ta
∂τ +
∂ta
∂w
dw
dτ
!
−
·
m− (1− ta)
µ
α− c1− uα
1− u
¶¸
du
dτ
)
.
(22)
The total revenue effect of a tax parameter change is decomposed into a direct effect,
depending on dta/dτ = ∂ta/∂τ + ∂ta/∂w · dw/dτ, and an indirect effect that works
through unemployment changes triggered by the tax policy. Rising unemployment
reduces the revenue generated by a tax parameter change. (The term in the second
square brackets in (22) is positive because m > a and 0 < ta < 1.) Tax parameters
are “Laffer-efficient” if dG/dt > 0 or dG/da < 0, respectively. For the two variants
of the model we have
case dta/dτ −du/dτ sum efficiency
NA: a 0 < 0 < 0 L-efficient
NA: t > 0 < 0 ? (L-inefficient)
IM: a < 0 > 0 ? (L-efficient)
IM: t (> 0) > 0 > 0 L-efficient
26
In the cases NA: t and IM: a, the two partial effects of dta/dτ work in the same
direction. However, du/dτ has the opposite sign so that the overall effect has to
be determined numerically. (The entries in the “efficiency” column that are in
parentheses are the results of the numerical calculations in Section 4.) In the cases
NA: a and IM: t, in contrast, the two partial effects of dta/dτ offset one another.
In NA: a they exactly cancel out; in IM: t, however, the overall effect depends on
the calibration values of the parameters. The sign given in parentheses for that case
depends on (w − a)(1− t)(1− u)− atu(1− α) > 0, which holds for the parameter
values used in the numerical calculations. The indirect effect has the same sign so
that in these cases the overall effect can be determined analytically.
7.5 Welfare effects
Welfare is measured by the expected income of the representative worker:
Y = [1− u(1− c)] (1− ta)w.
We thus have for tax parameter τ = t, a
dY
dτ = [1− u(1− c)]
Ã
(1− ta)dw
dτ − w
dta
dτ
!
− (1− c)(1− ta)wdu
dτ (23)
Using the results from Appendix 3, we can arrive at expressions similar to (22)
dY
dτ = −w
(
[1− u(1− c)]
Ã
∂ta
∂τ +
∂ta
∂w
dw
dτ
!
− 1− t
a
1− u [c− α+ αu(1− c)]
du
dτ
)
.
(24)
The similarity between (22) and (24) can be used to evaluate (14). Tedious but
straightforward calculations show that the welfare effect of a tax reform can be
expressed as
dY
dt
¯¯¯¯
¯
G=const
= mw2 [1− u(1− c)] 1− t
a
1− t
du/da
dG/da
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We know that dG/da < 0 (a is Laffer-efficient) in both variants of the model. The
welfare effect of a tax reform is then directly related to the partial effect of α on
the unemployment rate. Appendix 3 shows that du/da < 0 holds in the IM variant
of the model, but not in the NA variant. Thus in the first variant, but not in the
second, a tax reform that raises the marginal tax rate has positive welfare effects.
This analytical result is in line with the numerical calculations reported in Tables 2
and 4.
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Tax rate Unemployment Wage Tax revenue CRIP
0.688 0.100 1.000 2.268 0.694
0.686 0.079 0.993 2.301 0.694
0.684 0.050 0.984 2.366 0.694
0.682 0.020 0.975 2.423 0.694
(0.680) (-0.010) (0.966) (2.481) (0.694)
Table 1a: Partial variation of t with a constant at 0.2
(no alternative employment opportunities, z = 1)
Tax exemption Unemployment Wage Tax revenue CRIP
0.200 0.100 1.000 2.268 0.694
0.198 0.069 0.990 2.331 0.694
0.196 0.037 0.980 2.396 0.694
0.194 0.004 0.970 2.463 0.694
(0.192) (-0.031) (0.960) (2.532) (0.694)
Table 1b: Partial variation of a with t constant at 0.688
(no alternative employment opportunities, z = 1)
Tax rate Tax exemption Unemployment Wage Welfare change
0.688 0.200 0.100 1.000 0.000
0.650 0.235 0.075 0.992 0.112
0.610 0.277 0.047 0.983 0.254
0.570 0.324 0.020 0.975 0.386
(0.530) (0.377) (-0.009) (0.966) (0.519)
Table 2: Revenue-neutral tax reform (g constant at 2.268)
(no alternative employment opportunities, z = 1)
32
Tax rate Unemployment Wage Tax revenue CRIP
0.688 0.100 1.000 2.268 0.694
0.700 0.098 0.999 2.281 0.682
0.800 0.080 0.993 2.395 0.554
0.900 0.051 0.984 2.530 0.353
0.990 0.007 0.971 2.686 0.047
Table 3a: Partial variation of t with a constant at 0.2
(alternative employment opportunities with z = u)
Tax exemption Unemployment Wage Tax revenue CRIP
0.200 0.100 1.000 2.268 0.694
0.300 0.087 0.996 2.229 0.601
0.400 0.076 0.992 2.182 0.530
0.500 0.068 0.990 2.131 0.473
0.600 0.061 0.988 2.078 0.428
Table 3b: Partial variation of a with t constant at 0.688
(alternative employment opportunities with z = u)
Tax rate Tax exemption Unemployment Wage Welfare change
0.688 0.200 0.100 1.000 0.000
0.700 0.236 0.093 0.998 0.035
0.800 0.432 0.052 0.985 0.230
0.900 0.554 0.024 0.976 0.367
0.990 0.631 0.002 0.970 0.468
Table 4: Revenue-neutral tax reform (g constant at 2.268)
(alternative employment opportunities with z = u)
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Tax rate Unemployment Wage Tax revenue CRIP
0.688 0.100 1.000 2.268 0.694
0.700 0.098 0.999 2.281 0.682
0.800 0.079 0.993 2.396 0.554
0.900 0.050 0.984 2.531 0.353
0.990 0.007 0.971 2.686 0.047
Table 5a: Partial variation of t with a constant at 0.2
(explicit inter-sector mobility with z = (r+s)u/(ru+s))
Tax exemption Unemployment Wage Tax revenue CRIP
0.200 0.100 1.000 2.268 0.694
0.300 0.086 0.995 2.229 0.601
0.400 0.076 0.992 2.183 0.530
0.500 0.068 0.989 2.132 0.474
0.600 0.061 0.987 2.078 0.428
Table 5b: Partial variation of a with t constant at 0.688
(explicit inter-sector mobility with z = (r+s)u/(ru+s))
Tax rate Tax exemption Unemployment Wage Welfare change
0.688 0.200 0.100 1.000 0.000
0.700 0.237 0.093 0.998 0.036
0.800 0.434 0.051 0.984 0.234
0.900 0.555 0.023 0.976 0.369
0.990 0.631 0.002 0.970 0.468
Table 4: Revenue-neutral tax reform (g constant at 2.268)
(explicit inter-sector mobility with z = (r+s)u/(ru+s))
General Equilibrium in the Monopolistic Competition Model
separate Appendix to
“Tax Progressivity and the Trade Union’s Fallback Option”
Stefan Boeters, November 2000
One aggregate (or representative) household is characterised by the CES utility function
uh =
Ã
nX
i=1
(xhi )
η−1
η
! η
η−1
, (1)
which it maximises subject to the budget constraint
nX
i=1
pixi = I
h. (2)
This maximisation results in the FOC
xhi =
Xh
n
µ
P
pi
¶η
, (3)
where Xh is the composite commodity
Xh = n
1
1−η
Ã
nX
i=1
(xhi )
η−1
η
! η
η−1
(4)
and P is a price index
P =
Ã
1
n
nX
i=1
p1−ηi
! 1
1−η
, (5)
so that
Xh =
Ih
P
. (6)
Similarly, for the government, it is assumed that it produces a public good, Xg, with a CES
production technology
Xg = n
1
1−η
Ã
nX
i=1
(xgi )
η−1
η
! η
η−1
. (7)
1
Inputs are chosen so as to minimise costs
G =
nX
i=1
pixi (8)
subject to (7). Here we have the same type of demand fuctions as for the households
xgi =
Xg
n
µ
P
pi
¶η
. (9)
Firm i thus faces the output demand function
xi = x
h
i + x
g
i =
X
n
µ
P
pi
¶η
, (10)
where X = Xh +Xg. The firm maximises its profits
πi = pixi −wiLi (11)
in pi, xi and Li s. t. (10) and the production function
xi = AL
α
i , (12)
treating X,w and P as beyond its control. The maximisation results in the FOC
(1− 1
η
)pi =
1
α
wiLi
xi
, (13)
which takes the form of a mark-up rule as the RHS are the marginal costs of an additional output
unit. At the same time (13) fixes the income shares at
sL =
wiLi
pixi
= α(1− 1
η
) (14)
and sπ = 1 − sL. Substituting (10) and (12) into (13) gives labour demand, which depends only
on the sector-specific wage and the overall economic variables, X and P :
Li =
"µ
X
n
¶ 1η α(1− 1η )P
wi
A1−
1
η
# 1
1−α(1− 1η )
. (15)
The elasticity of labour demand is
εLiwi = −
d logLi
d logwi
=
1
1− α(1− 1η )
.
We now consider the symmetrical general equilibrium. It is caracterised by (a) pi = P, (b) wi = w,
(c) xi = Xn and Li =
L
n , for all i. This means, from (13),
(1− 1
η
)P =
1
α
wL
X
,
2
which, inserted into (15), gives aggregate employment in terms of the real wage
L =
·
nα(1− 1
η
)A
P
w
¸ 1
(1−α)(1− 1η )
,
from which aggregate production immediately follows by the production function. As only the real
wage is relevant, we can normalise the aggregate price level at this stage: P ≡ 1.
3
